When coalition forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban government rapidly collapsed, and the Islamist movement re-established itself as an insurgency. The coalition responded by moving through the country, setting up bases on a hub and spoke model as it went. The biggest of these bases, those such as Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, were as big as towns, holding thousands of soldiers, stores, hospitals, and logistics equipment. These big bases were ringed by progressively smaller bases, the smallest of which might hold just 15 or 20 men.
Whatever their size, the bases provided a static, defensible point from which patrols and operations could be launched to dominate the surrounding area.
Mao Zedong, the Chinese communist leader, famously said that the insurgent ‘must move among the people as a fish swims in the sea’. Achieving such invisibility allows a small insurgent force to engage with a much larger and more sophisticated force by means of ambushes, hit and run attacks, and attacks on supply lines. A network of bases as described above is designed to be the net with which to catch the fish.
The strategy employed in Afghanistan was nothing new. In the era following the Second World War that was characterized by both the Cold War and the process of decolonization, insurgencies sprang up all around the world. The tactics used varied depending on the theatre of war and the countries involved, but frequently involved the use of highly mobile operations launched from networks of bases. Such tactics were used to varying extents in conflicts such as the Vietnam War and the Malayan Emergency fought by the British. During the 1950s, the French had also innovated the use of armed helicopters in counterinsurgency warfare in Algeria to achieve greater mobility and firepower over the insurgents. The use of helicopters, then and since, allowed for lightening strikes into enemy territory to be launched from highly defensible positions.
But the use of patrol bases as a means of countering an insurgency is actually older even than this. It has been in use for at least 1000 years. Notably, it was the means by which William the Conqueror suppressed England following the Battle of Hastings in 1066.
The Conquest is often taught in a way that gives the impression that William simply won that battle and so won England. Actually, the battle was followed by a prolonged and bloody period of English resistance.
The Normans were clearly vastly outnumbered by the population of England, but they brought with them two major military innovations. The first was a heavily armoured and highly mobile cavalry who could cover long distances quickly and who were able to dominate English forces who predominantly fought on foot. In many respects, they were the armed helicopter of their day. The second innovation was the castle which, prior to 1066, was virtually unknown in England.
Because many of these castles stood for many hundreds of years, they evolved into enormous, stone structures but, during the initial phase of the invasion they were far more modest. Mostly, they were hastily built, wooden structures built on top of artificial mounds known as mottes. So quickly could these be constructed that as many as 700 castles were built during William’s twenty-one year reign, which is nearly three castles per month for over two decades. In some instances, the castles were even built along the same hub and spoke principle used recently in Afghanistan. For example, the Normans built major castles in London (of which only the Tower of London survives) and ringed these with nine smaller castles all within a day’s march of the city.
Whilst these castles weren’t pretty, they provided a defensible base from which William could launch highly mobile operations to suppress an insurgency in just the same way that modern armies do today.
Adam Staten is an author of fiction and non fiction. His first novel, Steadfast, is based on his experiences serving in Afghanistan. His second novel, Blood Debt, is set during the period leading up to the Norman Conquest.